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Abstract
The transition to a low-carbon power system requires growing the share of gen-
eration from (intermittent) renewables while ensuring security of supply. Policy-
makers and economists increasingly see a capacity mechanism as a way to deal with
this challenge. Yet this raises new concerns about the exercise of market power by
large players via the capacity auction. We present a new modelling approach that
captures such strategic behaviour together with a set of ex ante empirical estimates
for the new Irish electricity market design (I-SEM)in which a single firm controls
44% of generation capacity (excluding wind). We find significant costs of strategic
behaviour, even with new entry: In our baseline scenarios, procurement costs in the
capacity auction are around 150400 million EUR (or 40100%) above the compet-
itive least-cost solution. From a policy perspective, we also examine how market
power can be measured and mitigated through auction design.
Keywords: capacity market, strategic behaviour, competitive benchmark analysis, re-
structured electricity market, auction design
1 Introduction
Following several waves of merger activity since the 1990s, it is not uncommon for restruc-
tured electricity markets to be dominated by a small number of large players (Newbery
(1995)). This has justified the use of regulatory price caps to protect consumers from the
exercise of market power during periods of peak demand. Electricity markets now face
the new challenge of responding to countries' ambitious decarbonization objectives (e.g.,
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IEA (2016)). This means growing (intermittent) renewables generation while ensuring
security of supply is maintained during the energy transition.
It has recently been questioned whether an energy-only market can guarantee ade-
quate generation. Wholesale price caps that are set too low can lead to a missing money
problem (Cramton and Stoft (2006), Joskow (2008)), weakening investment incentives.
Growing wind and solar generation can exacerbate the adequacy problem by decreasing
the run-time of fossil-fuel generation. Uncertainty around government policye.g., re-
newables support mechanisms and the trajectory of carbon pricesis difficult to hedge
and can drive up the cost of capital.
Policymakers and economists increasingly see a market design that combines an en-
ergy market with a capacity market as a way to deal with these challenges (e.g., Cramton
and Stoft (2006), Joskow (2007), Cramton et al. (2013), Newbery (2016)).1 Capacity mar-
kets have in recent years been introduced in several European countries (e.g., Britain,
France) and already exist in regional US markets (e.g., New England, PJM). They allow
a government to procure its preferred level of resource adequacy at least cost via a com-
petitive auction; winning generators commit to being available at a future date against
an auction-determined capacity payment.
Our key observation is that the introduction of a capacity auction can give large
incumbents an additional lever to exercise market power. Hence the outcome may depart
from the least-cost solutionand be unfavourable for electricity consumers. Strategic
behaviour can involve withholding capacity (to drive up the capacity payment received
on remaining units) or predatory bidding (to induce rival exit from the electricity market).
A player's incentive to exert market power in the capacity auction depends on competition
in the electricity market, so these need to be modelled jointly.
In this paper, we present such a model with three components: (1) the electricity
market (featuring a small number of strategic players and a competitive fringe), (2) the
capacity auction and (3) industry dynamics, i.e., entry and exit decisions. We then
present an empirical application to the new Irish Integrated Single Electricity Market
(I-SEM), which is due to be implemented in 2018, and present a set of ex ante simulation
results.2
1Other potential solutions include a re-design of the electricity market (Hogan (2005), Roques (2008))
and a strategic reserve. Comparisons between different mechanisms are provided by de Vries (2004),
Cramton and Stoft (2006), Finon and Pignon (2008) and Léautier (2016).
2The analysis in this paper is based on ex ante simulation of the potential for exercise of market
power in the I-SEM design rather than ex post evaluation of actual firm behaviour. We do not suggest
that any individual company violates or intends to violate any applicable competition law.
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The Irish case is interesting for four main reasons. First, a single firm ESB controls
44% of generation capacity (excluding wind farms) so concerns about strategic behaviour
are already present. Second, the need to comply with the EU's Third Energy Package
means that Ireland is moving from a system of administrative capacity payments to
an auction; the committee responsible for the I-SEM's design noted that The I-SEM
capacity market is likely to exhibit structural market power, creating challenges for the
design of the auction (SEM Committee 2016, SEM-16-010, p. 23). Third, the Irish
market is salient from a renewables perspective: fast-growing wind generation accounts
for the bulk of new investment and over 20% of installed capacity in a system that has
traditionally been dominated by ESB's gas-fired generation. Fourth, the I-SEM capacity
market will be the first in Europe to feature a design based on reliability options (ROs).3
We quantify the impacts of strategic behaviour by ESB in the capacity market on
wholesale prices and buyers' costs of purchasing electricity across a range of scenarios
(e.g., different volumes of procured capacity, new entry).4 We find significant costs of
strategic behaviour, even with new entry: In our baseline scenarios, procurement costs
in the capacity auction are around 150400 million EUR (or 40100%) above the com-
petitive least-cost solution. From a policy perspective, we use the model to analyze the
performance of well-known screening tools (e.g., RSI) in measuring market power in the
capacity auction, and also explore how auction design can help mitigate market power.
We find that using a differentiated bid cap for incumbents can partially mitigate market
powerbut also shifts significant informational requirements back onto the regulator.
Our paper contributes to the literature on market power in wholesale electricity mar-
kets (Green and Newbery (1992), Wolfram (1999), Sweeting (2007) on Great Britain;
Borenstein et al. (2002), Joskow and Kahn (2002), Puller (2007), Mansur (2008) on
US markets). This work mostly employs competitive benchmark analysis: it derives the
competitive outcome via estimates of generators' unit costs and interprets any differences
compared to the simulated equilibrium as evidence of strategic behaviour. We extend this
3The RO design was proposed by Vázquez et al. (2002), studied by Chao and Wilson (2004), Bidwell
(2005), Oren (2005) and Cramton and Stoft (2008), and is already used in New England and Colombia.
An RO is a financial contract that entitles the system operator (buyer) to receive a difference payment
from a generator (seller) if the price in the electricity market exceeds a pre-defined strike price. Section
2 provides details.
4For reasons of computational feasibility, the empirical implementation of our model is restricted to
strategic behaviour by a single firm (ESB) in the capacity auction. To be as realistic as possible, we
allow the seven largest firms to have different degrees of market power in the electricity market. As a
result, we think that our estimates of the costs of strategic behaviour are likely to be conservative (given
that, in practice, multiple firms may have an incentive to behave strategically in the capacity auction).
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literature to the study of market power in the capacity market. We use a Cournot-based
model of wholesale electricity market in which the degree of forward contracting serves
as an index of competitiveness; higher contract cover pushes the equilibrium price down
towards the perfectly competitive level (Allaz and Vila (1993)).5 A common form of
vertical integrationpre-commitments to sell at a fixed retail pricehas the same effect.
We employ a similar approach to Bushnell et al. (2008), implemented as mixed integer
linear programming (Ito and Reguant (2016)).6
Our work complements to two recent theoretical papers on capacity markets and mar-
ket power. Schwenen (2014) uses a simple duopoly model to show how a non-competitive
clearing price in a capacity auction compensates firms for a loss of market power in the
electricity market. Léautier (2016) compares alternative capacity-market designs with
a focus on investment incentives, and finds that ROs reduce market power but do not
entirely eliminate it. Our analysis quantifies the impacts of strategic behaviour in an
empirical context, and also speaks to its policy implications.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the context of Irish electricity
market design. Section 3 sets out our modelling approach, and Section 4 explains how
we implement the model for the Irish case. Sections 5-7 contain our main analysis and
results: (i) the two benchmarks of an energy-only market and competitive bidding in the
capacity auction, (ii) the quantitative impacts of different forms of strategic behaviour
in the capacity market, and (iii) policy options to measure and mitigate market power.
Section 8 presents our conclusions.
2 Electricity market design on the island of Ireland
This section gives a brief overview of electricity generation on the island of Ireland, and
then outlines the key features of the transition from the old to the new Irish market
design (SEM and I-SEM).
Irish electricity generation. Table 1 summarizes the 2015 capacity and ownership
structure. Total generation capacity amounts to just over 12 GW. Natural gas is the
5The intuition is that a higher degree of forward sales reduces the remaining share of sales in the spot
market, thus reducing firms' incentives to affect that price.
6An alternative modelling approach uses the supply-function equilibrium (SFE)see, e.g., Green and
Newbery (1992), Wolfram (1999), Baldick and Hogan (2002). Its disadvantages in our setting include
greater complexity and a greater potential for multiple equilibria. See Willems et al. (2009) for further
discussion of the relative merits of SFE and Cournot-based models.
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Table 1: Registered nominal capacities (MW) (and number of generating units) of elec-
tricity generation firms in the SEM (by fuel type, excluding wind).
Firm Peat Coal Gas Oil Dist. Hydro Pump Other (%)
ESB 228 (2) 855 (3) 2625 (11) 53 (1) 221 (19) 292 (4) 18 (1) 44.1
SSE 464 (1) 588 (4) 208 (4) 12.9
AES 476 (2) 510 (3) 258 (6) 12.8
Viridian 764 (2) 6 (1) 7.9
NIE PP 595 (3) 18 (1) 6.3
Bord Gais 445 (1) 4.6
Tynagh 404 (1) 4.1
other 118 (1) 12 (1) 169 (3) 188 (3) 215 (8) 7.3
Share (%) 3.6 13.7 59.8 8.3 6.7 2.3 3.0 2.7
Source: `Registered Capacity Report July 2015' and `List of Registered Units' by the SEMO.
main fuel, with a capacity share of close to 50%; the second-largest fossil fuel is coal
with a share of around 13%. Wind power accounted for more than 20% of capacity.
Generation from other sources such as peat, oil, distillates, and hydro pumps plays a
more minor role; there is no nuclear power and negligible amounts of solar PV.7 The
largest player ESB owns a substantial 44% of total capacity (excluding wind farms) while
two other large firms, SSE and AES, control 14% and 13%, respectively. These three firms
are the only ones that hold a diverse portfolio of generating units which uses different
fuel inputs. Other players have small market shares and own only a small number of
generating units. There are also two 500 MW cross-border interconnectors to the British
electricity market: Moyle (between Scotland and Northern Ireland) and the East-West
interconnector (EWIC, between Wales and the Republic of Ireland).
Single Electricity Market (SEM). The SEM was established in 2007 when jurisdic-
tionally separate markets in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland were combined.
It is a gross mandatory pool in which the system operator calculates the least-cost dis-
patch schedule, resolves the System Marginal Price (SMP) for each trading period, and
centrally dispatches units.8 Generators also receive administrative capacity payments to
cover their fixed costs; the regulator allocates these across trading periods and generating
units. This centralized design is incompatible with the EU Third Energy Package's aim
of fully integrating electricity markets according to market-based principles.
7Conventional generation as of January 2018 was mostly the same as in 2015, with one new biomass
unit and one fewer gas unit; the number of demand response units increased from 8 to 26 (215 MW to
433 MW) and wind power grew from 2504 MW to 3751 MW.
8The SMP is the sum of two components: (i) a shadow price that reflects the short-run cost of the
marginal producer, and (ii) an uplift that indicates the amount which may be needed to cover start-up
and no-load costs (if the infra-marginal rent is not enough to cover these).
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Integrated Single Electricity Market (I-SEM). The new I-SEM market design will
differ from the SEM by: (1) introducing forward, day-ahead, intraday, and balancing
markets, which are cleared before the physical delivery takes place; (2) implementing
a new cross-border power flow algorithm; and (3) replacing the administrative capacity
mechanism with a market-based capacity auction. The third change is the motivation for
our analysis.9
The new capacity market will be based on auctioned reliability options (ROs). The
system operator (SO) purchases ROs from the capacity providers. An RO is a financial
contract that entitles the SO (buyer) to receive a difference payment from a generator
(seller) if the price in the electricity market exceeds a pre-defined strike price. ROs are
backed by physical generation capacity; the SO thus pays the generators an auction-
determined price for the sale of an optiona kind of market-based capacity payment.10
ROs will be sold in an annual uniform price auction. The SO determines the amount
of capacity needed for supply security; then it holds an auction to purchase ROs that
cover this capacity. Under current plans, the auction takes place 4 years before delivery
(T-4); there will also be shorter-term (T-1) auctions. In an auction, generators submit
a price bid for each of their units; this defines the price at which an RO backed by a
unit's generation capacity is offered.11 All existing units and new units that are credibly
available by the delivery year are eligible to bid; participation is mandatory for all existing
dispatchable units with at least 10 MW capacity. The auction clears at the minimum
price (EUR/kW) that procures the desired RO capacity. Generators that have bid no
more than this clearing price receive a capacity payment based on their winning capacity.
In turn, generators make a difference payment to the SO in trading periods where the
electricity market price exceeds a pre-defined strike price. This difference payment equals
the spread between the market price and strike price times the generators' RO capacity
sales.
With all generation capacity in a market sold as ROs, the strike price effectively sets
a price cap in the electricity market, thus fully hedging electricity buyers against higher
prices. In effect, a generator selling ROs concedes some peak-load profits in exchange for
9Under current plans, I-SEM will be implemented during 2018. The energy market should commence
in May 2018, the first T-1 auction is scheduled to take place in December 2017 with a delivery period
of May 2018September 2019; the first T-4 auction is planned for the end of 2018. See di Cosmo and
Lynch (2015) for a valuable discussion of competition issues in wholesale and retail markets under the
new I-SEM design.
10As holder of the ROs, the SO has the right but not the obligation to buy electricity at a strike
pricethus, the term reliability option.
11Specifically, each unit can submit a bid curve with a maximum of five incremental steps.
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the capacity payment. Generators that do not sell ROs do not need to pay the difference
payment and do not receive the capacity paymentbut they can still operate normally
in the electricity market.
3 The model
The model has three stages. First, firms sell capacity-backed reliability options (ROs)
in the capacity market. Second, firms decide which generating units stay active and
if any new units are built. Third, firms compete in the electricity market. A firm's
behaviour in an individual stage thus depends on its profits in the following stage(s). We
now describe the three stages in reverse order, and then summarize the properties of the
overall equilibrium.
3rd stage: Electricity market. The time interval is hourly, denoted by h ∈ {1, . . . , 8760}.
Total electricity demand Dtotalh varies across hours. Available generation units have been
determined by the first two stages. Strategic firms i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, operating a portfo-
lio of units j ∈ {1, . . . , Ji}, can exercise market power by bidding above their marginal
cost. Supply Sexogh is exogenous, for example, that of wind farms or must-run units. A
fringe of smaller firms act as competitive price-takers, bidding their true marginal cost;
their supply Sfringe(ph) depends on the hourly wholesale price ph. The residual demand
function faced by the strategic firms is thus: Dh(ph) = Dtotalh − Sexogh − Sfringe(ph). Fringe
supply makes this residual demand price-elastic.
Strategic firms compete à la Cournot: each chooses how much electricity to produce in
each hour, taking other firms' production as given. Firm i's short-run electricity-market
profit (excluding fixed costs and capacity payments) in period h is:
piih = Ph (Qh) (qih − qfih) + pfqfih − V Cih(qih)−DPih(Qh). (1)
Firm i's electricity generation is qih ≤ Kih, where Kih is its available capacity, and
Ph(Qh) ≡ D−1h (Qh) is the inverse of residual demand, where Qh ≡
∑N
r=1 qrh is total
generation by strategic firms. Firm i also delivers qfih of electricity which is sold forward
months or years earlier at a forward price pf .12 Firm's variable cost of generation is
12In our model, forward sales are exogenous and their share of total sales is constant across hours;
following Bushnell et al. (2008), qfih can also be interpreted as a fixed-price retail commitment. More
generally, there could be interactions with the introduction of a capacity market. For example, it may
crowd out liquidity from the forward market which, in turn, could make the electricity market less
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V Cih(·), and it makes a difference payment defined as:
DPih(Qh) = max
{
(Ph(Qh)− pstrike)× ki, 0
}
, (2)
where pstrike is the strike price of ROs procured in the capacity market, and ki is the
amount of capacity needed to back the ROs sold by firm i.
So i's first-order condition for an interior solution (0 < qih < Kih) is:
∂Ph (Qh)
∂qih
[
qih − qfih − 1
(
Ph(Qh) > p
strike
)
ki
]
+ [Ph(Qh)−MCih(qih)] = 0, (3)
where MCih(qih) ≡ ∂V Cih(qih)∂qih is marginal cost and 1(·) is an indicator function, which
equals one if the market price exceeds the strike price. The left-hand term captures the
mark-up over the competitive price due to strategic behaviour. All else equal, this mark-
up decreases with more forward sales qfih. Also, if the market price exceeds the strike
price, the mark-up decreases with more capacity sold as ROs ki. (Otherwise, the solution
is at a boundary, with qih = 0 or qih = Kih.)
Marginal cost MCih(q) is a horizontal aggregate of the marginal-cost functions of the
units owned by firm i. It varies across hours as all units are not always available. The
marginal cost function of a single generating unit is an increasing step function that has
one or more steps.13 Variable cost V Cih(q) is then a continuous increasing piecewise-linear
function that consists of linear segments with increasing slopes.14
The competitive fringe generates electricity with all capacity that has marginal cost
below the current spot price ph, so that Sfringe(ph) = MC
−1
fringe(ph), where the latter is the
inverse of the fringe firms' aggregated marginal cost (step) function.
Let qˆih(q−i,h) denote i's best response from (3) to rivals combined output q−i,h. In
Cournot equilibrium, firm i's annual maximized short-run profit from the electricity mar-
competitive (all else equal). Another possibility is that the capacity market induces a change to the
generation mix, and this also alters the overall degree of contract cover. Modelling such interactions is
beyond our scope but this is an interesting avenue for future research.
13To always find a unique solution in the simulations, the original marginal cost step functions are
altered a little to make them strictly increasing. Specifically, for each horizontal part, a 0.01 EUR increase
in price is assumed and, for each vertical part, a 1 MW increase in capacity is assumed.
14In practice, firms also face dynamic costs and restrictions (e.g., minimum load, start-up costs, ramp-
ing rate) when generating electricity; these are not included in the model as they would increase the
computation time enormously.
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ket is therefore:
pˆiSRi =
8760∑
h=1
max
qih
piih [qˆih(qˆ−i,h), qˆ−i,h(qˆih)] . (4)
This stage generally has a unique solutionexcept possibly in the case where the strike
price binds.15
2nd stage: Entry and exit. In the second stage, firms make binary decisions on which
of their incumbent units remain activeand which potential new units are built. These
take as given the outcome of the capacity auction in the first stage: the unit price of
capacity pcp and the generating units that won in the auction. Let wij = 1 if firm i's
unit j has won the capacity payment, and otherwise wij = 0. Let aij = 1 denote active
units that are available to generate, and denote inactive units that have been closed or
not built as aij = 0. Winning units in the auction are committed to be active (i.e.,
wij = 1 ⇒ aij = 1) while units that do not win in the capacity auction can still operate
in the electricity market.16 Let the vector ai ≡ (aij)Jij=1 collect the activity levels of all
units owned by i
Strategic firm i's optimization problem is to choose ai to maximize its long-run profits,
given other firms' decisions a−i, so that:
pˆiLRi = max
ai
{
pˆiSRi (ai, a−i)−
Ji∑
j=1
aij FCij + p
cp ki
}
, (5)
where FCij is the fixed cost of its jth unit (which accrues only if this unit is active)17, ki
is its winning capacity from the auction, and pcpki is its capacity payments. Observe that
firms' decisions in this second stage will affect short-run profits pˆiSRi in the third stage as
these will depend on all active units in the electricity market, that is, aij ∀ i, j. Fringe
firms also choose their active units to maximize their long-run profits. Unlike strategic
15There may be hours for which (3) is not satisfied when Ph (Qh) ≤ pstrike or when Ph (Qh) > pstrike.
In these hours, the market price settles to the strike pricebut there is an infinite number of best-
response production combinations that result in this market price. We resolve this multiple equilibria
issue by selecting a vector of production quantities that is on the line connecting the equilibria of the
two unconstrained first-order conditions. See the literature on Cournot competition with a price cap for
details (e.g., Buehler et al. (2010)).
16Strategic behaviour in the capacity market affects the final generating portfolio via this commitment.
17We treat the investment cost for a new generation unit as a fixed cost which is split across the unit's
lifetime; hence, all else equal, the fixed cost FCij is higher for new units than for existing units. Exit
costs, arising from the decommissioning of units, are omitted in the modeling because of limited available
information across different types of generation.
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firms, they cannot make commitments in the capacity market to keep loss-making units
active.
In equilibrium, no strategic or fringe firm can increase its long-run profits by: (i)
closing an active unit that does not receive a capacity payment, or (ii) entering the market
with a new-build unit. This stage potentially has multiple equilibriaas is well-known
from the industrial-organization literature on entry models, see, e.g., Einav (2010).18 We
resolve this potential multiplicity by assuming that, starting from the existing generator
portfolio, entry/exit decisions happen one unit at a time: the incumbent unit with highest
losses is closed first and the potential entrant with the highest post-entry profits enters
first.19 For fringe firms, this always leads to an efficient portfolio. However, the overall
generation portfolio can deviate from the efficient outcome since the strategic firms can
affect the entry and exit process by their behaviour in the capacity market.
1st stage: Capacity market. Existing units as well as potential new-build units par-
ticipate in an annual capacity market, modelled as a descending-clock auction. To begin,
to-be-procured capacity K and the difference-payment strike price pstrike are announced.
In the first auction round (r = 1), the auction price pcpr is set to equal the bid cap. Each
firm decides for each of its generating units whether the unit stays in the auction or
quits. If there is more capacity left bidding than K, then auction proceeds to the next
roundand the price is decreased by one step, pcpr+1 = p
cp
r −∆pcp. The auction ends when
the bidding capacity drops below K (or the price reaches zero).
Formally, denote the exit price for firm i's unit j as bij; if the auction price drops
below this price, this unit quits the auction. The auction stops at round r̂ if the (de-
rated) capacity in the auction then falls below the target capacity:∑
i, j
1(bij ≤ pcpr̂ ) δijKij ≤ K <
∑
i, j
1(bij ≤ pcpr̂−1) δijKij, (6)
where δij is a technology- and size-specific de-rating factor, and Kij is the unit's nominal
capacity. Then the clearing price pcp = pcpr̂ and the winning units wij = 1(bij ≤ pcpr̂ ). The
committed capacity used as the basis for the firm's difference payment DPih(Qh), see
18To illustrate, consider two units A and B. It is possible that both units are unprofitable if both are
active in the market, A becomes profitable if B exits and similarly B becomes profitable if A exits. A
rule on move order is needed to resolve this multiplicity.
19These decisions are myopic in that they do not factor in future entry/exit decisions of rivals. Another
modelling assumption could be that the loss-making unit of a smaller firm exits first and that a larger
firm enters first. This may lead to a more concentrated final generation portfolio, particularly when the
electricity market is very competitive.
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(2), and capacity payment pcp ki is: ki =
∑Ji
j=1wij δijKij. Strategic firm i's optimization
problem is to choose a bid vector bi ≡ (bij)Jij=1 that, given other firms' bids b−i, maximizes
its long-run profits that result from the entry and exit process of the second stage:
max
bi
{
pˆiLRi (bi, b−i)
}
. (7)
Fringe firms simply bid the price that each generation unit needs to break even in terms
of its long-term profits, given the other units in the marketor they bid zero if the unit
is already profitable.20
This stage also may have multiple equilibria. Our empirical application below resolves
this by restricting attention to market power exerted by a single large strategic firm.
Finally, we make an assumption that reduces the action space for strategic firms: In the
capacity auction, strategic firms choose increasing bid curves such that their units are
always in the same order. That is, even if individual bids change, the same unit is always
assigned the highest bid, and the same unit always has the second-highest bid, and so
on. Hence the order of units is the same as in the competitive benchmark.21 (Note that
this assumption holds only for individual firms, not for the aggregated bid curve.)
Equilibrium. The three stages of the model are nested: the objective function of a
strategic firm in each stage contains the solution of the maximization problem in the
following stage. The overall equilibrium occurs where none of the strategic firms wishes
to unilaterally change its behaviour in any stage. See Appendix A for a visual description
of firms' decision flow and the model equilibrium.
Our analysis will focus on the annual total costs for electricity buyers which arise,
20This is conceptually equivalent to how competitive units behave in the electricity market: they bid
their static marginal costs, and units bid lower than the marginal unit are dispatched. An important
difference is that, in the capacity market, competitive units' profits and, therefore, their bids also depend
on the total active generation portfolio in the market.
21Our approach is similar to that used in Sweeting (2007), where different strategies adopted by an
individual firm in the electricity market are compared by multiplying the price bids for all of its units
by the same coefficient. To illustrate the issue, consider a firm with 14 units in the auction which has P
price levels (pcp1 , p
cp
2 , . . . , 0). If these units can be in any order in the bid curve, there are P
14 possible
bid combinations. In a uniform price auction it is enough to know, whether an individual bid sets the
price, or is above or below the clearing price. Still, there is a large number of combinations, which units
bid above and which below the clearing price. Under our assumption, there are 15 possible actions for
each auction price level pcpr : all units bid higher than the auction price; unit 1 bids lower and others
higher; unit 1 and unit 2 bid lower and others higher; and so on. Thus, the firm has P × 15 different
actions to choose from. It seems plausible that more efficient units bid lower in practicesuch that a
firm increases the likelihood of its best units staying in the market.
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respectively, from the electricity and capacity markets:
total buyer cost in electricity market =
8760∑
h=1
[
ph (Qh −Qfh) + pf Qfh
]
total buyer cost in capacity market = pcp
∑
i,j
wij δijKij,
where pf is the average price over the year and Qfh is the amount sold forward by all firms
together at hour h. In the absence of detailed information on buyers' willingness-to-pay
for supply security, we view total costs across the electricity and capacity markets as a
proxy for consumer welfare
4 Implementing the model for the Irish market
4.1 Using information from the SEM design
The model is calibrated using 2015 data from the Irish SEM.22 The two main data sources
are EirGrid for data on the status of the Irish power system,23 and the SEMO for detailed
trading data such as bids, prices, payments, and generation quantities.24
Demand, exogenous supply, and prices. We use system demand reported by EirGrid
to obtain the hourly total demand for electricity. EirGrid also publishes an estimate of
total output of all wind farms in the system. To account for the supply and demand by
pumped hydro storages, we use these units' metered generation data as published by the
SEMO. This reveals a fairly regular diurnal pattern: pumped storages run at nighttime
and generate electricity at daytime, independently of the electricity price. Net imports
into Ireland are driven mainly by variation in demand and wind farm production. When
total demand net of wind energy is high, more electricity is imported from Great Britain,
and vice versa. Moreover, the correlation between hourly interconnector load and the
price difference between the SEM and the British electricity market is weak.25 This
suggests that market participants use interconnectors primarily to hedge their generation
22See Appendix A for further details on the computational implementation of the model.
23See www.eirgridgroup.com → How the Grid Works → System Information.
24See www.sem-o.com → Market Data → Dynamic Reports, and www.sem-o.com → Publications →
General Publications.
25Specifically, the correlation coefficient between the price difference (SMP vs N2EX day-ahead price)
and the interconnector load is only 0.14 (using 2015 data).
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portfolios against demand fluctuations in the domestic market (rather than for price
arbitrage). Therefore, we consider supply from wind farms, pumped hydro storages and
interconnectors as exogenous. Finally, we use the SEMO's half-hourly data on realized
electricity prices (SMP and shadow price).
Generating units and ownership. We combine generator data from the `Registered
Capacity Report' from July 2015 and plant ownership data from the `List of Registered
Units' published by the SEMO. For units that report using multiple types of fuel, we
determine their main fuel source by drawing on other data sources such as firms' websites.
The SEM classifies all registered units either as price makers or price takers. Price makers
are units that are dispatched based on the market price while price takers take the market
price as given. We consider all units defined as price takers and price-making hydro units
(which typically bid zero) as must-run units. These units include all peat, hydro, biomass,
and waste units. There are also a few price-taking oil and gas units serving industrial
processes: two oil units (in an alumina refinery) and one gas unit (CHP in an industrial
bottling plant), which run very steadily so we consider them as must-run. This leaves 55
price-making units of coal, gas, oil, distillate, and demand response that effectively set
the half-hourly price in the SEM.
Bidding and marginal costs. The SEM bidding code obliges firms to bid their true
short-run marginal costs, so we assume that observed bids truthfully reveal each unit's
costs. These bids are publicly available on the SEM website for each unit and half-hourly
trading period. A bid for a single unit consists of at most 10 price-quantity pairs; typically,
firms use only 1-4 pairs. Firms' bids vary slightly between days over the year, mostly due
to changes in fuel and carbon prices.26 To simplify calculations, we use a representative
bid curve for each unit for all hours; specifically, we select a day that represents the unit's
median bid submitted over the year.
Capacity payments and fixed costs. In the SEM, the regulatory authority determines
the total amount of capacity payments for a specific year by using two estimates: (1) the
annualized fixed costs of a best new entrant peaking plant, and (2) the amount of capacity
required to guarantee the security of supply. For 2015, the annualized fixed cost for the
26Irish electricity generators have been part of the EU's Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) since
2005, and therefore need to hold sufficient permits to cover their carbon emissions. These carbon costs
are part of a unit's short-run marginal costs. The 2015 year-average EU ETS price was approximately
EUR 7.50/tCO2; the price near the end of 2017 was similarly around EUR 7/tCO2.
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reference plant was estimated to be 91.88 EUR/kW/year.27 Adjusting for revenue from
ancillary services (4.53 EUR/kW/year) and infra-marginal rent (5.75 EUR/kW/year, re-
ceived when capacity is scarce and the marginal plant bids the price cap), the amount
used as a basis for the capacity payment was 81.60 EUR/kW/year.28 Finally, the esti-
mated amount of required capacity was 7046 MW.29 In 2015, total generating capacity
was higher than required, so the capacity payments received by existing units were less
than the estimated fixed cost. Using SEMO data (Dynamic Reports → Capacity Pay-
ments by Unit), we calculate that the average capacity payment for gas, oil, and distillate
units in 2015 was 54.50 EUR/kW/year. Since this was the only revenue made by several
units in the market, we take this as the fixed cost for all existing gas, oil, and distillate
units. The fixed costs of coal units are typically higher; we assume that their fixed costs
are fully covered by the average capacity payment and the infra-marginal rent. For the
five coal units, this was 119.01 EUR/kW/year in 2015.
Availability and de-rating factors. We use Monte Carlo simulation based on SEMO
data to account for forced outages and scheduled maintenance as well as for de-rating
factors in the capacity auction.30
4.2 Modelling the new I-SEM design
Strategic players. For the electricity market, we assume that the seven largest firms by
capacity (ESB, SSE, AES, Viridian, NIE PP, Bord Gais, Tynagh) behave strategically,
while the other eight smaller firms form a competitive fringe. The strategic firms own a
27For the years 2013-2015, the reference plant was a hypothetical 196.5 MW plant with an Alstom
GT13E2 turbine, located in Northern Ireland, using distillate as a fuel, with a 20-year lifetime and a
forced outage probability of 5.91%.
28We also use these figures to estimate that profits from ancillary services are around 2% of total
profits for a typical generating unit.
29See `SEM-14-070: Decision Paper on Capacity Requirement and Annual Capacity Payment Sum
for Calendar Year 2015' for the capacity payment decisions and `SEM-12-078: Decision Paper on BNE
Peaker for 2013' for the detailed cost breakdown for the best new entrant plant. Both documents can be
found at www.semcommittee.com → Publications.
30`SEM-16-051a: Capacity Remuneration Mechanism: Proposed Methodology for the Calculation of
the Capacity Requirement and De-rating Factors' is available at www.semcommittee.com→ Publications.
We use the information in Table 3 (outages & maintenance) and Table 4 (de-rating factors). For gas
units, there is a 3.6% probability of forced outage; for coal, oil, and distillate units it is 7.2%. Occasional
non-availability of generating units is taken into account by de-rating the nominal capacity of each unit
in the capacity-auction bids so that each unit's actual contribution to procured capacity is less than its
nominal capacity. For gas turbines, the de-rating factors vary from 91.1% to 95.8% while they vary from
83.1% to 91.8% for coal, oil, and distillate units.
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total of 41 generating units.31 The literature on wholesale electricity markets commonly
assumes that only larger firms behave strategically while smaller players bid competitively,
and there is empirical evidence to support this difference in bidding behaviour according
to firm size (e.g., Hortaçsu and Puller (2008)). For the capacity market, we assume that
ESB can behave strategically while all other firms bid competitively; this is because the
computation time of the model simulations otherwise becomes unworkable.
Forward contracting in the electricity market. The competitiveness of the elec-
tricity market in the I-SEM is not yet known. Our analysis therefore presents results
for different levels of forward contracting, ranging from zero forward sales (which leads
to the standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium) to 100% forward sales (which corresponds to
perfect competition). We place a particular focus on 60-80% contract cover given that
this (i) is consistent with estimates of market competitiveness in the extant literature on
competition in wholesale electricity markets, and (ii) reflects real-world practice in other
European countries.32
Procured volume in the capacity market. We obtain simulation results for volumes
of procured capacity within the range of 40007500 MW. Note that these volumes refer
only to capacity procured from the 41 units owned by the strategic players. For compari-
son, maximum demand in the 2015 SEM was 6397 MW, and realized demand net of wind
production varied from zero to 6074 MW. Given that there currently is excess capacity
in Ireland, it seems likely that the I-SEM will procure somewhat less than currently ex-
isting capacity (see Table 1). Indeed, the first I-SEM capacity auction in December 2017
stands to procure 7030 MW of (de-rated) capacity.33 Of this, around 1000 MW comes
from must-run units, pumped hydro, wind farms34 and interconnectorswhich are not
included in the capacity volumes reported in our modelling. Hence this first procurement
volume corresponds to around 6000 MW in our numbers.35 Procurement volumes far
31The total capacity of the competitive fringe (418 MW) is small relative to the strategic players (8129
MW), and its units have relatively high marginal costs. These consist of one 12 MW gas unit, one 3 MW
oil unit, 3 distillate units (total 188 MW), and 8 demand response units (total 215 MW). (Note that
must-run units are not included here as they are exogenous in the model whereas table 1 lists all units.)
32ECA (2015) provide a useful overview of forward-contracting products and practices in Europe; see
also Anderson et al. (2007) and Ritz (2016) for related empirical evidence and analysis.
33The detailed parameters of the first auction can be found in `Final Auction Information Pack v1.0.pdf'
in www.sem-o.com → I-SEM → Publications.
34Wind power is de-rated strongly in the capacity auction (in the first auction the de-rating factor was
0.103). Therefore, even if wind power capacity is large in Ireland and increasing rapidly, wind farms are
not significant players in the capacity market.
35Comparing at a later date our ex ante results with ex post I-SEM market outcomes may thus require
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away from 6000 MW may currently seem unlikely but it will be useful to understand the
market-power implications of (i) having no idle units as in an energy-only market, and
(ii) procured capacity approaching existing capacity.
Bid cap and RO strike price in the capacity auction. We assume that there is a
bid cap in the capacity auction, which is common to all bidders and set to 140 EUR/kW
as a baseline. This is approximately 1.5 times the net cost of new entry (net CONE),
accounting for electricity market and ancillary market revenues. This kind of multiplier
is used in several capacity markets, including in the British capacity auction. We use 500
EUR as the strike price used for the RO difference payment, given that this value is often
mentioned in the I-SEM consultation documents.
New entry. Our entry modeling has four key features. First, we consider a range of
volumes up to 3 GW, reflecting uncertainty over how much new entry will occur. Second,
we choose the technologies of entering units to approximate the existing (non-renewable)
capacity mix. Third, the ownership of new units is dispersed to ensure that entry makes
the market less concentrated (at a similar fuel mix). Fourth, similar to other non-ESB
players, new firms behave competitively in the capacity marketbut may have a degree
of market power in the electricity market. Specifically, we assume that five new firms own
all potential new generating units. Three own a gas-fired unit with 300 MW of nominal
capacity, one owns an oil unit (200 MW), and one owns a distillate unit (60 MW); the
combined capacity is 1160 MW or 1082 MW after derating, i.e., approximately 1 GW.
We also consider twice these entry volumes (e.g., one firm now owns two 300 MW gas
units, etc.)although 1 GW new entry is the most plausible scenario in the short term.
We take the new units' availabilities and de-rating factors to be the same as for incum-
bent units; their fixed costs are higher due to investment costs.36 We use the marginal-
cost curve made up of incumbent units of the same fuel type to derive a representative
efficiency level for the new firms.37
some adjustments to capacity figures to put them back on a like-for-like basis.
36We take these from SEM-12-078.
37To illustrate, consider a case with three new gas units. We construct a cost curve for incumbent
gas units by sorting them in increasing order of their marginal costs, and then fit a polynomial function
to smoothen this curve. To obtain a representative efficiency level for the three units, we give one the
minimum, one the median, and one the maximum marginal cost. More generally, with m new units, we
use the same procedure to space them evenly along the constructed cost curve.
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5 Analytical benchmarks
5.1 Energy-only market
Our first benchmark is an energy-only market that operates without any capacity mech-
anism. Firms then receive revenue only from the electricity market. Several generation
units in the SEM are rarely needed to meet total demand, and these unprofitable units
now exit the market one by one. This continues until the marginal unit can just cover
its costs (also raising the profits of remaining incumbent units). Simulations show that
of the original 41 units, 13 units are left in the energy-only market in a less competitive
market (0-60% forward contract share); this corresponds to 3971 MW of existing capacity
exiting. With a more competitive electricity market, total revenues (buyer costs) fall
and only 12 units (80% forward contracts) or 11 units (100% forward contracts) stay in
the market. The earliest exits include those of high-cost oil and distillate units owned by
SSE and AES.
The highest prices in the energy-only market occur for two reasons: firms withhold
generation or demand exceeds total capacity. In a more competitive market, more high-
cost units exit; this reduces the average price (over the year)but it also means that
demand exceeds capacity in more individual hours, so that the maximum market price
can rise in such times. Figure 1 shows price duration curves. With a fully competitive
market, firms' stepwise marginal cost functions are tracked exactly, leading to jumps in
the price duration curve. Reduced competitiveness shifts the curves outward, especially
during high-price hours. This is driven by changes in the strategic players' generation
volumes, with ESB reducing its generation most strongly. NIE PP also withholds output
as it benefits disproportionately from the exit of several units of similarly-sized rivals SSE
and AES.
In sum, an energy-only market entails significant exit of existing small high-cost
unitstogether with the possibility of significant strategic behaviour by large players.
5.2 Capacity market with competitive bidding
Our second benchmark introduces a capacity market in which all firms behave competi-
tively. A competitive bid is equal to the amount that a generating unit needs to break
even in the long term. In general, it will depend on (i) the total generation portfolio in
the market, and (ii) the competitiveness of the electricity market.
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Figure 1: Price duration curves in an energy-only market (for different shares of forward
contracting).
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Figure 2 shows two simulated aggregate supply curves in the capacity market. These
are constructed by showing the bids of existing units in increasing order, and illustrate the
competitive clearing price in the capacity market, given a particular volume of procured
capacity. Units with low marginal cost run most of the time and are profitable without
any capacity payment, so their competitive bids in the capacity auction are zero. Other
units bid between zero and their fixed cost depending on how much of their fixed cost
they can cover with profits from the electricity market. Competitive bids are generally
higher if the electricity market is fully competitive (solid blue line, 100% forwards) than
if it is not very competitive (dashed red line, 0% forwards). Intuitively, firms then make
less revenue in the electricity market so need more of a top up from the capacity market.
The bids of ESB's three coal units illustrate the effects of ownership. These are
marginal units with higher marginal costs than its gas-fired units. With less competition
in the electricity market, ESB uses only its gas units. Therefore its coal units have
to bid their fixed costs to break even (dashed red line), which are considerably higher
than the gas units' fixed costs of around 60 EUR/kW (accounting for de-rating). By
contrast, with a competitive electricity market, all firms' generation volumes are higher;
this raises the profits of ESB's coal units and allows them to bid lower in the capacity
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Figure 2: Capacity market with competitive bidding (for different shares of forward
contracting).
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market. It also interesting to contrast ESB's bidding behaviour with its smaller rival
AES. AES similarly owns coal-fired plants but these have the lowest costs within its
generation portfolio. These are always used and profitableand hence always bid zero
in the capacity market.
In sum, relative to the energy-only market, the introduction of a competitive capacity
market tends to induce ESB to make more use of its coal-fired generation by allowing it
to cover their fixed costs. In the subsequent sections, we use competitive bidding as the
benchmark to measure strategic behaviour, the cost of which can be calculated as the
deviation from the competitive least-cost outcome.
6 Impacts of strategic behaviour
We next present baseline simulation results for the capacity market with strategic be-
haviour, where participation is limited to incumbents. We then examine the impacts of
new entry, and quantify the total cost of strategic behaviour across a range of scenarios.
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6.1 Strategic behaviour without new entry
Figure 3 displays the competitive benchmark for the capacity auction against simulated
clearing prices if ESB can bid strategically. Both are derived assuming a competitive
electricity market (with 100% forward contracts). This illustrates how ESB (i) would
pursue different bidding strategies depending on the total volume of capacity procured,
and (ii) can exert market power via the capacity market even if the electricity market is
competitive.
First, if 4500 MW or less capacity is procured, ESB submits bids at below-competitive
prices for some of its units. This forces some of its rivals' units out of the marketso
that ESB then owns over half of the units active in the electricity market. Such predatory
pricing in the capacity auction affords ESB higher profits in the electricity market, and
these outweigh the lower capacity payments. Second, if 4750 MW or more capacity is
procured, ESB submits the highest-possible bid for as many units as needed to ensure
that one sets the clearing price at the 140 EUR/kW bid cap.38 This compares with a
competitive price of around 60 EUR/kW, which would just cover the fixed costs of ESB's
mostly-idle gas units. ESB here gains by sacrificing these gas units in the auction and
instead getting the maximum price for its remaining units (which is profitable even if
only few units remain active).
ESB is said to be pivotal when its capacity is necessary to achieve the desired level
of capacity; this region is shown to the right of the vertical green dashed line in Figure
3. In such situations, ESB can directly take actions that set the clearing price in the
capacity auction at the bid cap. However, note also that ESB can still wish to engage
in predation if it is not pivotal, for instance where 4750 MW is procured.
ESB's strategic behaviour in the capacity market also depends on the competitiveness
of the electricity market. For weaker competition, with 80% or less forward contracts,
predatory pricing ceases to be beneficial where procured capacity is less than 4500 MW;
instead, ESB bids competitively with all units. In such cases, a more competitive electric-
ity market again means a less competitive capacity market, as small changes in capacity-
market bids can then have a larger effect on the resulting active generation portfolio.
38We analyze in Section 7.2 the impacts of setting a lower bid cap for incumbents. See also SEM-16-
010 (Section 4.7) for discussion of other practical measures to control market power, including: making
bidding mandatory for all generators (to prevent withholding of individual units), not allowing units
that fail to participate in a capacity auction to participate in subsequent auctions, not allowing large
incumbents to act as aggregators for small third-party bidders, designing suitable rules on information
sharing as well as pro-active market monitoring.
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Figure 3: Capacity market with strategic behaviour (competitive electricity market, no
new entry).
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Loosely speaking, this raises the potential returns to strategic behaviour.
As discussed in Section 4, the amount of procured capacity in the future I-SEM is
likely to lie between 55007000 MW. Figure 3 shows that, with 100% forward contracting,
ESB's preferred strategy in this range is capacity withholding. Our simulations confirm
that this finding is robust across all degrees of electricity-market competitiveness (from
zero up to 100% forward sales).
6.2 Strategic behaviour with potential new entry
Apart from security supply from existing generation, a capacity market can also attract
new entrants. We here study several scenarios in which new firms bid in the capacity
auction, and then build new generating units if they win. Like incumbents other than
ESB, potential entrants may have a degree of market power in the electricity market but
bid competitively in the capacity market.
Figure 4 illustrates clearing prices in the capacity market when the electricity market
is fully competitive and there are five new firms with 1082 MW of potential new capacity.
With no supra-competitive mark-ups in the electricity market, new units have to submit
relatively high bids in the capacity auction to be able to cover their costs. Consequently,
a capacity-withholding strategy is not as profitable for ESB as aggressively as in the
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no-entry case. For example, with procured capacity of 6000-6500 MW, ESB bids just
low enough to keep four new potential entrants out of the market. The less capacity is
procured the more new units ESB wants to keep out. By contrast, if 6750 MW or more
capacity is procured, then ESB accommodates all entry and withholds capacity such that
the clearing price is equal to the bid cap.
In Figure 5, there is again 1082 MW of new capacitybut now there are high mark-
ups in the electricity market (with 0% forward contracts). Therefore, new entrants now
submit very low bids in the capacity auction, with most units bidding zero. For ESB,
this means that some of its units may be displaced by new entrants and it can exert
less market power than in the case without new entry (see Figure 3). For example,
with 6250 MW or more procured capacity, entrants displace ESB's low-cost capacity,
pushing the competitive benchmark to the right while ESB's strategy relative to the
competitive benchmark stays approximately the same. However, ESB can still set the
clearing price at the bid cap across a significant range of volumes of procured capacity.
Intermediate degrees of competitiveness in the electricity market (between 0% and 100%
forward contracts) yield outcomes that lie between the two extremes of Figures 4 and 5.39
In sum, new entry constrains ESB's strategic behaviour to some extent, depending on
how competitive the electricity market is and how close different potential entrants' bids
are to the clearing price in the capacity auction.
6.3 Total costs of strategic behaviour
Table 2 summarizes outcomes across different market designs in our baseline scenario
(6000 MW, 80% forwards). Relative to an energy-only market, the introduction of a
competitive capacity market (CM) raises number of active units from 12 to over 30
(resulting in much higher fixed costs); this prevents the electricity price from exceeding
500 EUR/MWh and reduces the average price as well as buyer costs in the electricity
market by around 10%. Relative to this competitive benchmark, strategic behaviour
in the capacity market (CM0, CM1, CM2) leaves the number of active units mostly
unchanged; any new entrants replace less efficient incumbents and further reduce the
electricity price.
The key finding of this paper is that strategic behaviour in the capacity auction
39In our model, new entry occurs only via the capacity auction; more generally, these new entrants
might also enter an energy-only market. Our focus is on the costs of strategic behaviour in the capacity
market (relative to competitive bidding) rather than the comparison between a capacity-market design
and the energy-only market.
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Figure 4: Capacity market with strategic behaviour (competitive electricity market, 1
GW new entry).
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significantly raises total buyer costs. Depending on the amount of entry, the clearing
price for procuring 6000 MW rises from 59 EUR to 89-140 EUR and total buyer costs
in the capacity market rise by 175-480 mEUR (or 50136%). Lower buyer costs in the
electricity market are outweighed by the direct effect of higher buyer costs in the capacity
auction itself: the combined costs to buyers rise by 2-29%.40
Table 3 illustrates the impacts on total buyer costs of varying (i) the volume of
procured capacity and (ii) the competitiveness of the electricity market (for a scenario
with 1 GW new entry). First, a higher procured capacity raises total buyer costs in
the capacity auction, even with competitive bidding; Table 3 shows how it typically also
raises the costs of market power as ESB becomes relatively more pivotal. Moreover, our
simulations suggest that higher procured capacity has little knock-on impact on total
buyer costs in the electricity market. Second, as already suggested by Figures 4 and 5,
the interaction with the competitiveness of the electricity market can depend on the fine
details of the auction.41 For procured capacity of 6000 MW, a more competitive electricity
40The RO design does not meaningfully limit market power in these scenarios: the capacity market
pushes the maximum electricity price down to 362 EUR/MWh, so the RO strike price of 500 EUR/MWh
never actually binds. See Appendix B for further analysis on the impacts of setting a lower RO strike
price.
41The two columns with forward contracts of 100% and 0% correspond, respectively, to outcomes with
different procured capacities as per Figures 4 and 5. For example, in Figure 4, procured capacity of 7000
MW is achieved at a clearing price of 140 EUR/kW: hence the increase in total buyer costs relative to
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Figure 5: Capacity market with strategic behaviour (Cournot-Nash electricity market, 1
GW new entry)
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market tends to increase the impact of strategic behaviour on buyer costs in the capacity
market; the additional buyer costs are up to 230 mEUR (or around 60%) across a range
of scenarios. However, with low procurement of 5000 MW and 60% forward contracting,
strategic behaviour in the capacity auction decreases buyer coststhis is an instance of
predatory pricing (similar to Figure 3 above).
In sum, for plausible scenarios with around 6000 MW procured capacity, 60-80%
forward contracting, and up to 1 GW new entry, our simulations suggest that strategic
behaviour raises buyer costs in the capacity auction by around 150-400 mEUR (40-100%)
above the competitive least-cost solution. This translates into an increase of around
10-25% in buyer costs across the electricity and capacity markets, and suggests that
policymakers' concerns about market power are well-founded.
7 Measuring and mitigating market power
In this section, we assess a widely-used ex ante screening tool for market power, and then
examine several auction designs to mitigate market power.
the competitive benchmark equals (140 EUR/kW  97 EUR/kW) × 7000 MW = 301 mEUR.
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Table 2: Outcomes under different market designs (electricity market with 80% forward
contracting, capacity market with 6000 MW procured capacity).
Market design Energy-only CM CM0 CM1 CM2
Total buyer costs, electricity market (mEUR) 1406.5 1285.7 1285.7 1161.8 1138.4
Total buyer costs, capacity market (mEUR) - 351.9 831.7 575.0 527.6
Weighted average electricity price (EUR/MWh) 66.1 60.2 60.2 54.0 52.8
Maximum electricity price (EUR/MWh) 1632.9 361.6 361.6 298.1 274.8
Hours when price > 500 EUR/MWh 21 0 0 0 0
Total variable costs (mEUR) 623.4 626.8 626.8 639.7 628.6
Total fixed costs (mEUR) 248.2 385.0 385.2 416.5 416.5
Capacity auction clearing price - 59 140 97 89
Number of active generating units 12 32 31 32 32
Active nominal capacity (MW) 3988 5965 5941 5928 5928
CM = competitive capacity market, CM0 = strategic capacity market without entry, CM1 = strategic
capacity market with 1 GW entry, CM2 = strategic capacity market with 2 GW entry
Table 3: Increase in total buyer costs in the capacity market due to strategic behaviour:
(with 1 GW entry, varying procured capacity and competitiveness of electricity market).
Forward contracts 100% 80% 60% 0%
5000 MW 15 [5%] 11 [4%] -11 [-4%] 0 [0%]
6000 MW 224 [62%] 227 [64%] 151 [44%] 9 [3%]
7000 MW 301 [44%] 560 [133%] 561 [134%] 564 [136%]
8000 MW 304 [37%] 48 [4%] 46 [4%] 46 [4%]
7.1 Measurement: Residual Supply Index
The Residual Supply Index (RSI) is often used in antitrust analysis to measure a firm's
ability to exercise market power. The RSI for ESB in the capacity market is calculated
as RSIESB = (total capacity − ESB capacity) / (procured capacity), where total ca-
pacity includes all pre-existing capacity as well as any capacity of potential entrants.
Smaller RSI values should indicate that the firm can exercise more market power, given
that it is larger relative to the market overall. If its RSI is less than 100%, then ESB
is pivotal because its capacity is then necessary to meet the target procured capacity.
Often, an RSI of at least 110120% for each firm in a market is seen as desirable.42
We compare the RSI with the Lerner index for ESB, which measures the share of its
mark-up in the capacity payment.43 A negative correlation with the RSI is expected
given that a higher Lerner index signifies greater market power. Figure 6 plots these
for three different amounts of procured capacity, assuming throughout an 80% forward
42See e.g. Twomey et al. (2006).
43Lerner index is the price mark-up in the market divided by the total payment. It varies from 0%
(fully competitive market) to 100% (price consists of mark-up only).
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contract share in the electricity market.44 The correlation between the RSI and the
Lerner index is 0.218: negative but not very pronounced. The three left-most points
on each curve, with very low Lerner index values, reflect the clearing price being set by
ESB's high-cost/low-margin coal units. Conversely, there are several scenarios with large
mark-ups even where ESB's RSI exceeds 110%. Figure 6 also captures how additional
entry affects ESB's market power. While new entry raises ESB's RSI (by construction),
it appears to shift the Lerner-index curve rightwards more than it pushes it downwards.
Even with considerable new entry, entrants' bids may be in such a narrow price range
that incumbent firms can still exercise market power. This reflects that fixed costs do
not vary much between (hypothetical) new units, and are higher than for existing units.
In sum, the RSI is an imperfect indicator in this application. It seems to work
relatively better with little new entry into the marketbut a high RSI above 110%
may not be a reliable signal for low market power, especially in conjunction with new
entry.45
7.2 Mitigation: Lower bid cap for incumbent units
One policy option to limit the exercise of market power is to set a lower bid cap for
incumbent generating units than for new entrants. This approach has been used, for
example, in the British capacity auction design; see also the suggestions in Cramton and
Stoft (2008). The objective is to ensure that new entrants set the clearing price; the
approach has obvious appeal if new entrants do indeed bid competitively and procured
capacity exceeds existing capacity. A drawback is that, with excess capacity, the lower
bid cap will often bind, implying that the regulator effectively chooses the clearing price;
this runs against the spirit of using a market mechanism in the first place.
Figure 7 shows results for a scenario in which incumbent units can bid at most 60
EUR/kW while potential entrants have the previous bid cap of 140 EUR/kW.46 The
44Each point in the graph corresponds to a specific amount of procured capacity. Procured capacity
starts from 5000 MW on the right-hand side of each curve and increases to the left with 250 MW
increments. By definition, RSI increases when there is more entry and the procured capacity stays the
same.
45Two other familiar measures of potential market power are similarly imperfect. First, the Pivotal
Supplier Indicator (PSI) is a special case of the RSI: PSI=1 if RSI<100% and PSI=0 otherwise; it is
clear that ESB's market power can be significant even where its PSI=0. Second, the Irish electricity
market is highly concentrated with a Herfindahl index (HHI) of 2468; 2 GW new entry pushes this down
to 1691 but again Figure 6 shows that this can still be consistent with significant market power in the
capacity auction.
46The lower bid cap is approximately 65% of estimated net CONE in Ireland (91.88 EUR).
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Figure 6: Measuring market power in the capacity market using the Residual Supply
Index (for different procured capacity volumes, 80% forward contracting).
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electricity market is perfectly competitive (100% forward contracts) and there is 1 GW
of entry. We find that, as long as existing capacity (6681 MW) falls short of procured
capacity, this yields a competitive clearing price in the capacity auction. If 4750  6500
MW is procured the lower bid cap is binding. With a less competitive electricity market,
some new entrants bid below the incumbents' bid cap; ESB then sets a strategic price at
the level of this lower bid cap. More generally, less competition in the electricity market
increases the range of outcomes in which the lower bid cap is binding.
In sum, these results suggest that a bid cap can partially help to mitigate strategic
behaviour but its implementation will depend on the regulator having a sufficiently de-
tailed understanding of the market environment. Bids caps will tend to be more effective
where the electricity market is already relatively more competitive.47
8 Conclusion
The use of capacity mechanisms is growing as electricity markets around the world are
being re-designed to cope with the challenges posed by the energy transition. Policymak-
ers are already concerned about the potential for strategic behaviour by firms in capacity
47Similarly, using a downward-sloping demand curve can, at least in some cases, mitigate market power
in the capacity auctionthough we find that it needs to be well-coordinated with bid-cap setting. See
Appendix C for further details.
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Figure 7: Capacity market with a lower bid cap for incumbents (competitive electricity
market, 1 GW new entry).
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auctions but the literature has so far contributed only little to this topic. This paper has
presented a new model of market power across both the electricity market and capacity
auction together with ex ante simulation results for the new Irish I-SEM design.
We leave important issues to future research: (1) extending our model implementation
to multiple strategic players in the capacity auction; (2) examining how the introduction
of a capacity market interacts with firm behaviour in balancing and forward markets; (3)
incorporating the increasing roles of battery storage and demand-side aggregation; (4)
considering the overall welfare impacts of strategic behaviour, including its environmental
impacts.
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Appendix A: Further details on model implementation
1 Firms’ decision flow and equilibrium
Figure A.1 summarizes the maximization problems of the strategic firms. The three stages
are nested: the objective function in each stage contains the solution of the maximization
problem in the following stage. In the electricity market (3rd stage), given the units
active in the market and their capacity-market commitments, firms’ short-run profits
are determined based on a Cournot game augmented with forward contracting. In the
entry and entry phase (2nd stage), firms decide which new units enter and which existing
units exit; these decisions are made based on a unit’s long-run profits—which include
its short-run profits. In the capacity market (1st stage), firms maximize long-run profits
which reflect the outcome of the subsequent industry entry and exit process; they choose
bids for their generating units—and the capacity auction determines the winning units
and their capacity payments. The overall equilibrium occurs where none of the strategic
firms wishes to unilaterally change its behaviour in any stage.
Figure A.1: Decision flow and the three stages in the model.
1. Capacity market
firms select
bids bij
to maximize pˆiLRi
2. Entry and exit
firms select
entry and exit aij
to maximize
long-run profits
3. Electricity market
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quantities qih
to maximize
short-run profits
wij , p
cp
maximal long-run profits
pˆiLRi
aij , wij
maximal short-run profits
pˆiSRi
2 Computational implementation
The model is implemented in Matlab. To keep the computation time feasible, some
linear approximations are made—so that fast linear optimization algorithms can be used.
We formulate the firm-optimization problem in the electricity market as a mixed integer
linear programming problem1 and use the CPLEX library from IBM2 to solve for the
1We use the Matlab code provided on Mar Reguant’s website (https://sites.google.com/site/
marreguant/) as a starting point for the electricity-market model implementation but then modify and
extend the code in several ways.
2See http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/ibmilogcpleoptistud/.
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equilibrium.3 The capacity market is implemented in iteration loops, where the electricity
market is nested in the innermost loop.
2.1 Linear approximation of residual demand curves
We construct the hourly residual demand curves Dh(ph) = Dtotalh − Sexogh − Sfringe(ph)
faced by strategic firms as follows. First, we calculate the exogenous supply Sexogh and
form the supply curve of the competitive fringe Sfringe(ph) by aggregating their bids; note
that the latter is a step function. Second, we fit power functions4 for hourly residual
demands functions such that Dh(ph) = αh pβhh , where αh and βh are constants that vary
over hours. Following Ito and Reguant (2016), we then use the linear tangent curves of
these non-linear power functions drawn in the point of the observed hourly price (SMP) to
approximate hourly residual demands. Figure A.2 illustrates these curves for one specific
hour.
If the competitive fringe starts to supply only at a sufficiently high price, this method
means that the residual demand function remains inelastic at a “low” price. In such
cases, the power function approximation is no longer valid, and the Cournot equilibrium
requires elastic residual demand. To generate some price-responsiveness, we take a linear
extension of the demand curve formed at the upper limit of the inelastic part. For
the I-SEM, this can be interpreted as increasing exports when the price is lower (as
interconnectors probably will be more price-sensitive than in the SEM). Furthermore, we
assume no entry or exit within the competitive fringe.
Finally, to guarantee a unique solution, we slightly adjust firms’ marginal cost step
functions to make them strictly increasing. Specifically, for each horizontal part, a 0.01
EUR increase in price is assumed and, for each vertical part, a 1 MW increase in capacity
is assumed.
2.2 Solution algorithm for overall equilibrium
We use an algorithm formulated as a descending-clock auction to calculate the overall
equilibrium of the model.5 There are three nested iteration loops for each set of auction
parameters. The steps are as follows:
1. The auction parameters are announced: to-be-procured capacity K, RO strike price
pstrike, initial bid cap pcp1 . Firms’ forward-contract commitments are common knowl-
edge.
3Because the hourly equilibria do not depend on each other, using parallel computation decreases the
total computation time considerably.
4After trying several functional forms, we found that a power function fit the data best. The residual
demand function thus has a constant elasticity in each hour, which mostly lies between –0.05 and –0.25.
Ito and Reguant (2016) use a quadratic curve.
5Given that they are strategically equivalent, this can also be interpreted as a first-price sealed-bid
auction; however, this equivalence is not exact in our setting because of the exit-order assumption and
the interdependency of the winning units—but these differences do not affect the main results.
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Figure A.2: Linear residual demand approximation for one hour.
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2. A bid strategy for ESB for any given auction price pcpr is selected. This defines
how many of ESB’s units are “bidding in” (bij ≤ pcpr ) and how many are “bidding
out” (bij > pcpr ). Because of the generation unit bid order assumption, the number
of units bidding in (or out) identifies those units, and thus ESB has 15 different
strategies in this phase.6
3. All incumbent generation units and all potential entrants are assumed to be active
in the market (aij = 1∀ i, j). It is first assumed that the auction clears at the
auction bid cap pcp1 .
4. Capacity payments and difference payment commitments for each firm are calcu-
lated. Generating units that are owned by competitive firms and that are not closed
(aij = 1) are assumed to bid lower than the clearing price.
5. The annual electricity market is simulated. Firms’ short-run and long-run profits
are calculated. Profits for individual generating units are calculated.
6The full strategy space for ESB consists of a two-dimensional grid which defines how many units bid
in at each auction price (e.g. at 80 EUR ESB bids 0,...,14 units in, at 79 EUR ESB bids 0,...,14 units in,
etc.). However, many of these combinations result in too little or too much capacity. In this algorithm,
this grid is traversed in an order where the number of units bidding in is first fixed, and the price level
is then adjusted from the auction bid cap pcp1 to zero (e.g. ESB bids 3 units in at price 140,...,0 EUR).
Such price is found when the required capacity is just reached.
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6. The generating unit that makes the highest losses is identified. If it is owned by a
competitive firm, it is closed (aij = 0). If it is owned by a strategic firm (only ESB
in our unilateral case), it is closed only if it has been bid out (aij = 0 if bij > pcpr ,
i.e., is not receiving the capacity payment).
7. Steps 4-7 are repeated until all units that are active are also profitable or none of
ESB’s loss-making units can be closed because of their capacity-market commitment
(Loop 1 ).7
8. If the aggregate (de-rated) capacities of active units that receive the capacity pay-
ment is higher than K, then the auction clearing price is decreased by one unit
(pcpr+1 = pcpr −∆pcp). Steps 4-8 are repeated until the committed (de-rated) capacity
in the market reaches the amount of the targeted procured capacity or the auction
clearing price reaches zero (Loop 2 ).8
9. The final auction clearing price pcpr̂ , the total generation portfolio (identities of the
active units in the market) and ESB’s profits under this strategy are saved. Another
strategy for ESB is selected, and Steps 3-9 are repeated until all possible strategies
for ESB are tested (Loop 3 ).
10. The strategy that results in the highest profits for ESB is chosen. This also deter-
mines the final generator portfolio.
Appendix B: Varying the strike price of reliability op-
tions
Our main analysis in Sections 5 and 6 uses a 500 EUR/MWh strike price for the reliability
options (ROs), based on the I-SEM consultation documents.9 The precise strike price in
the Irish market varies monthly according to a formula that accounts, e.g., for variations
in fuel prices as well as in the EU ETS carbon price; for the I-SEM’s first delivery period,
it is always at least 500 EUR/MWh. The underlying idea is that the strike price is
chosen approximately at the highest marginal cost across generators; in this case, it is
based on the marginal costs of the demand response units. Table 2 already shows that
this 500 EUR/MWh strike price never actually binds, neither in the competitive capacity
market benchmark (CM) nor in the strategic capacity market scenarios (CM0–CM2).
7This loop results in a generator portfolio for which the assumed clearing price pcpr is enough to keep
each unit active but in most cases the auction price is so high that there is more capacity than needed.
8This loop results in a generator portfolio for which the assumed clearing price is enough to keep each
unit active and such price level pcpr̂ that the target capacity K is just reached.
9For comparison, the actual market price in the SEM exceeded 500 EUR/MWh only in 4.5 hours
during the 2015 year.
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This means that the RO design in these cases has no impact on the equilibrium in the
electricity market.10
We here present further sensitivity analysis by varying the value of the RO strike price.
Setting a higher strike price leads to identical results as reported in Table 2 so we here
focus on the impact of a lower strike price. Observe that, since the strike price effectively
acts as a price cap in the electricity market, a generating unit with marginal cost higher
than the prevailing strike price cannot make any money in the electricity market—and is
therefore reliant on a capacity payment to be able to stay active. In general, the impact
of a tighter price cap in the electricity market is that generating units, as “compensation”
tend to require a higher capacity payment.
Figure B.1 shows the aggregate bid curve for 2015 of the price-making units under
the old SEM market design; as discussed in Section 2, these bids reflected generators’
true marginal costs.11 The highest bids were indeed submitted by demand response units
(200–400 EUR/MWh) followed by distillate units (80–150 EUR/MWh). Hence, 2.4% of
total capacity cannot make any money at a strike price of 200 EUR/MWh; this becomes
10% of total capacity at a 100 EUR/MWh strike price.
Figure B.1: Aggrerate supply curve in the 2015 SEM (true marginal costs of all generation
units).
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We begin by examining how a lower strike price affects the benchmark with a com-
petitive capacity auction (similar to Section 5.2, specifically Figure 3). Specifically, we
10In general, an RO design with an arbitrarily high strike price is isomorphic to a capacity mechanism
without reliability options.
11As explained in Section 4.1, the capacity values in this SEM figure correspond to those of Table 1
(rather than to those of our capacity-auction analysis in Sections 5 and 6).
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consider scenarios with 6000 MW procured capacity, 80% forward contracting in the
electricity market, and 1 GW entry. Table B.1 shows how a lower strike price reduces
the average market price and total buyer costs in the electricity market—but only at a
relatively modest rate.12 Roughly put, the impacts of a “tighter” RO design are qual-
itatively similar to greater forward contracting in the electricity market but appear to
be quantitatively much weaker. The reason is that most units either always (i) bid zero
or (ii) bid their losses (i.e., fixed costs) in the capacity auction—and varying the strike
price makes little difference to this. The strike price does, however, put an increasingly
tight cap on the market price; for example, the 60 EUR/MWh strike price binds in 22%
of total hours. Such low RO strike prices currently seem unlikely to be employed in the
I-SEM; they again correspond to a situation in which the capacity-market design is, in
effect, directly choosing an equilibrium price.
Table B.1: Capacity market with competitive bidding for different RO strike prices (elec-
tricity market with 80% forward contracting, capacity market with 6000 MW procured
capacity, 1 GW entry).
Strike price (EUR/MWh) 500 200 100 75 60
Total buyer costs, electricity market (mEUR) 1168.9 1167.4 1150.2 1134.0 1106.3
Total buyer costs, capacity market (mEUR) 351.6 351.6 351.6 351.6 347.5
Weighted average electricity price (EUR/MWh) 54.4 54.3 53.6 52.7 51.4
Maximum electricity price (EUR/MWh) 332.7 200 100 75 60
Hours (of 8760) when the strike price is binding 0 8 119 401 1892
Total variable costs (mEUR) 636.9 636.9 637.0 637.3 630.6
Total fixed costs (mEUR) 405.2 405.2 405.2 405.2 390.8
Capacity auction clearing price 59 59 59 59 59
Number of active generating units 29 29 29 29 29
Active nominal capacity (MW) 5959 5959 5959 5959 5889
Figure B.2 illustrates how a 100 EUR/MWh strike price affects the capacity auction
under (1) the competitive benchmark and (2) strategic bidding by ESB. First, as sug-
gested by the previous discussion, with competitive bidding, the impact turns out to be
small. The reason is that, if 5000 MW or more capacity is procured, then the clearing
price in the capacity auction is set by a unit that is mostly idle in the electricity market.
Such a unit does not make significant revenue from the electricity market in any case, and
thus needs the capacity market to cover its fixed costs. The clearing price rises appre-
ciably only in cases where 3500–4500 MW capacity is procured. Second, ESB’s strategic
bidding also remains very similar to that under the 500 EUR/MWh strike price, notably
in our baseline scenario where 6000 MW capacity is procured. ESB only bids higher in
cases with 4000–4250 MW procurement—for which the underlying competitive clearing
price is itself also higher. In any case, these low volumes of procured capacity are unlikely
to be empirically relevant for the I-SEM.
12The scenario with a 500 EUR/MWh strike price is very similar to the competitive scenario CM
reported in Table 2; the only difference is that the former includes 1 GW of entry while the latter has
no entry.
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Figure B.2: Capacity market with strategic behaviour (electricity market with 80% for-
ward contracting, no new entry).
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In sum, our simulations suggest that even substantially lower RO strike prices than
the 500 EUR/MWh baseline have only modest impacts on the electricity market as well
as total buyer costs. In this sense, the RO design seems quite robust to the choice of
strike price but also yields perhaps surprisingly small consumer benefits (relative to a
capacity auction without reliability options).
Appendix C: Mitigation: Downward-sloping demand for
capacity
Another policy design is for the regulator to instead use a downward-sloping demand
curve such that the volume of procured capacity adjusts downwards as the auction price
rises. This tends to push down the clearing price, and can thus mitigate the exercise of
market power in the capacity auction. However, it also means that the regulator can no
longer be certain about the amount of capacity that will be procured.
We explore this by comparing a vertical capacity demand for 6000 MW to a linear
capacity demand curve with a slope of —30 MW/EUR, for which we assume that 6000
MW is procured at a clearing price of 70 EUR (which lies halfway between zero and the
original bid cap of 140 EUR).13 Hence, at a 100 EUR clearing price, only 5100 MW is
procured, while capacity demand is 6900 MW at a clearing price of 40 EUR.
Again assuming 80% forward contracts, we find that the clearing price falls from the
original 97 EUR with vertical demand down to 81 EUR for the –30 MW/EUR slope.
13In the first capacity auction in the I-SEM, if the clearing price is zero, 7774 MW is procured. For
each one EUR increment in price, approximately 13 MW less capacity is procured. If the clearing price
exceeds 82 EUR the procured capacity is constant (6720 MW). (See details in ‘Final Auction Information
Pack v1.0.pdf’ available in www.sem-o.com → I-SEM → Publications.) In the British capacity auction
similar kinked demand curve is used.
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Two other considerations now arise: (i) the auction procures less than the initial 6000
MW—so the outcome is not directly comparable to the case with vertical demand, and
(ii) we find that the lower clearing price can deter potential new entrants from actually
entering the market.
We can also explore the price implications of using both a downward-sloping demand
curve and a lower bid cap for incumbents (again using our baseline scenario with 6000
MW initially and 80% forwards). With a bid cap above 100 EUR, we find that the impact
of the demand slope is identical to the original case with 140 EUR. Conversely, a bid cap
at 80 EUR or below always binds, so adjusting the capacity-demand curve then has no
impact on the clearing price. The idea that these two instruments are complementary in
mitigating market power is appealing. However, at least in this case, they are effective in
different situations: there is no price effect from (i) bid-cap adjustments above 100 EUR,
and (ii) demand-slope adjustments with a bid cap below 80 EUR.
In sum, this initial analysis suggests that using a downward-sloping demand curve
can, at least in some cases, mitigate market power in the capacity auction—though it
can also discourage new entry and needs to be well-coordinated with bid-cap setting.
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